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The roles of transparency and trust in the relationship 
between corruption and citizen satisfaction 
 
Abstract 
Reducing corruption and improving citizen satisfaction are important aims of 
government, yet the link between these two policy aims has rarely been explored.  This 
article reports a study into the roles played by transparency and trust in the relationship 
between governmental corruption and citizen satisfaction with public services.  The 
study was based on data gathered in South Korea to evaluate a specific initiative which 
had sought to reduce corruption and increase citizen satisfaction with public works 
programs.  The data indicated that the relationship between corruption and satisfaction 
were moderated by transparency and partially mediated by trust. 
Points for practitioners 
The study sheds light on the roles of transparency and trust in the relationship 
between corruption and citizen satisfaction with public services, and thus provides 
insights for developing policy aimed at curtailing corruption and improving satisfaction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between corruption and satisfaction is generally under-researched.  
The logical assumption is that corruption will have a negative impact on satisfaction, 
though one might argue that the ongoing electoral success of some old-style political 
bosses might indicate that the public will tolerate a degree of corruption in exchange for 
what they perceive to be a well-run city (cf. Manzetti and Wilson, 2006).  Transparency 
and trust are seen to moderate or mediate the relationship between corruption and 
satisfaction (Driscoll, 1978; Heise, 1985; Jahansoozi, 2006; Rawlins, 2008; Pathak et al., 
2008).  Many societies believe that transparency will reduce governmental malfeasance 
through its „sunshine‟ effect (Heald, 2006), and demand for transparency has grown 
rapidly, with organizations in both private and public sectors being encouraged to be 
more transparent – see Ball (2009) for a review of this development.  Gaining citizens‟ 
trust is similarly a high priority challenge for public organizations.  The objective of this 
study was to increase our understanding of the relationship between corruption and 
citizen satisfaction, and the roles of transparency and trust in that relationship, providing 
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insights for research, and for practitioners seeking to develop policy for improving 
citizen satisfaction. 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The relationship between corruption and citizen satisfaction 
Corruption occurs as a form of behaviour violating the official ethics of public 
service.  It can occur in the private sector or in the public sector and often occurs 
simultaneously in both (Klitgaard, 1988).  One of the most widely cited definitions of 
corruption is offered by Nye (1967/2002: 284) who defines it as „behaviour which 
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, 
close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the 
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence,‟ succinctly defined by Rose-
Ackerman (2008: 551) as „the misuse of public office for private gain.‟  Barker and 
Carter (1994) define corruption in a more detailed way as acts containing three 
elements: violations of law, rules, regulations, or ethical standards; misuse of an 
officer‟s position; and acceptance of some actual or expected material reward or gain.  
Corruption, regardless of its forms, undermines the performance of public services and 
decreases satisfaction with them, neatly captured in Rose-Ackerman‟s description of 
corruption as „a symptom that something has gone wrong in the management of the 
state‟ (1999: 9).  Perceived corruption erodes public respect for the government as a 
service provider and disappoints citizens, thus fostering cynicism about government.  
We might therefore expect the relationship between corruption and satisfaction to be 
negative, yet despite its obvious importance this relationship has scarcely been 
investigated – see Manzetti and Wilson (2006) for an exception.   
Customer satisfaction is of great importance to public agencies that function as 
service providers to their citizens.  When public services are provided to citizens on 
demand, governments, particularly local governments, devote considerable resources to 
meeting the needs of their citizens.  Levels of citizen satisfaction have been measured 
through various methods, broadly speaking either through measuring overall 
satisfaction or by measuring the attributes of service that make up satisfaction with it 
(Gustafsson & Johnson, 2004).  Cumberford et al. (1999) analyzed citizen satisfaction 
using a scale which examined perception of service quality in terms of key drivers of 
satisfaction: courteous, knowledgeable, and competent staff, as well as timeliness, 
fairness, and getting the desired results.  Similarly Giannoccaro et al. (2008) examined 
citizen satisfaction using a modified version of the SERVQUAL scale (Parasuraman et 
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al., 1988), which had been developed to measure those attributes of a service which 
impact on customer satisfaction.  Outside of academic research, local governments have 
often used survey methods to evaluate levels of service and citizen satisfaction with a 
service and to identify opportunities for improvement. 
 
The role of transparency 
Transparency is generally defined as the open flow of information (Holzner & 
Holzner, 2006; Piotrowski, 2007), and the literature on transparency in the relationship 
between governments and citizens has strongly emphasized this concept of openness.  
Oliver argues that „transparency in an organization is not only about what‟s 
communicated externally, but about what‟s right on the inside, in the guts of its 
operations‟ (2004: 37), and introduces the concept of „new transparency‟ to describe the 
trend for organizations to face more active demands for disclosure of information.  In 
the past many governments passively provided information only on request, and could 
do so at their own discretion, now they are being required to engage in more active 
disclosure.  Piotrowski (2007: 10) states that „governmental transparency equates to 
open government.‟  The oft-cited definition of transparency by the Asian Development 
Bank (1995) is „the availability of information to the general public and clarity about 
government rules, regulations and decisions.‟  Transparency has become an important 
agenda in nearly every organization, public and private, large or small, with Hood 
(2006: 3) suggesting it has „attained quasi-religious significance in debate over 
governance and institutional design.‟  Ball (2009) suggests transparency is starting to 
subsume accountability in public discourse about good governance.  This sharply 
growing demand for transparency is based on many factors.  First, transparency is one 
of the fundamental moral claims in democratic societies, with the people‟s right to have 
access to government information being widely accepted in representative democracies 
(Pasquier & Villeneuve, 2007).  Second, transparency is one of the practical measures 
taken to curtail corruption, acting as a deterrent against corrupt behaviour by promoting 
citizens‟ vigilance, thus deterring public officials from misusing public service to attain 
private gain (Florini, 2007).  O‟Neill (2006) observes that it can thus serve as a strategy 
to deter corruption and correct poor performance.  Third, transparency has a positive 
effect on trust and accountability (Heald, 2006).  According to Holzner and Holzner 
(2006: 114), „transparency is linked with the values of accountability,‟ as it allows 
citizens to monitor the quality of public services and encourages public employees to 
satisfy citizens.  The literature on transparency advises that organizations should be 
transparent to increase the degree of trust (Rawlins, 2008), though some scholars urge 
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caution, citing the negative aspects of transparency, such as violation of privacy, direct 
cost of disclosure, and revelation of sensitive information (Prat, 2006: 91).  Chambers 
(2004: 389, 392) reminds us that although publicity is in important principle in 
deliberative democracy, secrecy rather than publicity is often what is needed to ensure a 
high quality of deliberation.  Heald (2006: 62) stresses that „transparency is expected to 
contribute positively to trust by building credibility,‟ and it is to a consideration of the 
role of trust that we now turn.  
 
The role of trust 
The literature on trust is long-established and extensive.  Rousseau et al. (1998: 394-
395), having examined the definitions of trust used in various disciplines, defined trust 
as „a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another‟ and concluded that there 
are no significant differences between disciplines in their definitions of trust.  From an 
organizational perspective, trust is „a collective judgment of one group that another 
group will be honest, meet commitments, and will not take advantage of others‟ 
(Rawlins, 2008: 5; see also Cummings & Bromily, 1996), and in a similar vein 
Tschannen-Moran and Hoy (2000: 556) define trust as „one party‟s willingness to be 
vulnerable to another party based on the confidence that the latter party is (a) benevolent, 
(b) reliable, (c) competent, (d) honest, and (e) open.‟  Nooteboom, Berger, & 
Noorderhaven (1997: 318) explain that „trust is identified with a subjective probability‟ 
that a partner will not be contrary to one‟s expectations, and suggest that it is an 
instrument of good governance, even though not in itself a sufficient condition for 
cooperation.  Examining the effects of trust on relational risk perceived, Nooteboom, et 
al. (1997) report that trust reduces the risk created by the subjective probability of loss.  
Describing trust as „a product of rational expectation without any moral residue‟, Hardin 
(1996: 28) distinguishes trust from trustworthiness, the latter akin to a „moralized 
account of trust, „in which the potential truster is held morally accountable for a failure 
to trust.‟  
Welch, Hinnant, & Moon (2005) argue that trust in public institutions is enhanced 
through their administrative rules, standards, laws, and regulations relating to provision 
of services and information.  Public agencies can improve such institutional trust by 
adopting new technologies such as government web sites, suggesting that ICT-based 
public service delivery can be one of the institutional enablers for enhancing trust in 
moral accountability, through making its process more transparent and reducing public 
officials‟ discretionary power.  Trust in government or public services is typically 
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measured in terms of citizens‟ subjective judgments based on their experience, 
suggesting that citizens‟ trust will arise when a government or its public service is 
viewed by citizens as competent, reliable and honest, whilst also meeting their needs.  
Exploring the reasons that public trust in government has declined in the United States, 
Thomas (1998) suggests three conceptions of trust, namely fiduciary trust, mutual trust, 
and social trust.  Fiduciary trust is built upon under the highly asymmetric relationship 
between citizens and governments.  Public trust in government agencies and their 
employees to work in their best interests is created when citizens sufficiently monitor 
and control governments‟ performance, suggesting that trust is in principle a 
precondition for citizen satisfaction.   
Trust seems likely to enhance the public‟s satisfaction with services.  Rawlins (2008) 
points out that trust, along with transparency, is an important indicator of a satisfactory 
relationship between a government and the public.  Corruption, real or perceived, 
reduces citizens‟ perception of government performance in public services, negatively 
influencing citizens‟ trust.  It frustrates the public, leading to reduced trust in 
governments.  Note however that the observed decline in trust may not be simply 
caused by corruption but rather by a growth in cynicism.  Whilst a government which is 
seen as corrupt will not be respected, it may still retain a sufficient level of trust to be 
able to function, for reasons such as „soundness of the democratic system and a respect 
for technocracy and expertise‟ (Fieschi & Heywood, 2004: 21).  By contrast, even when 
a government is seen as clean (not corrupt), citizens may not trust it due to cynicism 
arising from differences of political views, alienation, etc. 
 
Research model and hypotheses 
As we have seen, there are differing interpretations as to the likely relationship 
between corruption, citizen satisfaction, transparency and trust, and no obvious 
consensus emerges.  The hypotheses presented below therefore represent the most likely 
relationships in the context of the present study.  Welch et al. (2005: 377) argue that 
“the interaction between trust and satisfaction is recursive: trust leads to satisfaction, 
and vice versa.”  In our study, we hypothesize that trust is a mediating variable in the 
relationship between corruption and satisfaction, but we recognize that many scholars 
treat satisfaction as the independent variable and trust as the dependent variable (Van 
Ryzin, 2007).  Our model is not necessarily at odds with this earlier work, since many 
theorists propose feedback loops from trust to satisfaction.  Though not stated in these 
terms, such models appear to imply that satisfaction will precede trust, but that once 
trust is engendered it will have a positive impact on satisfaction.  For example, although 
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Vigoda & Yuval (2003) report a linear relationship (quality → performance → trust), 
thus showing that trust increased citizen satisfaction, they found that the impact of 
satisfaction on trust was significant as well.  The focus of prior research has been upon 
improvements in service, rather than reduction in corruption, and in developing our 
model we speculated that, in the case of services perceived as corrupt, the role of trust is 
likely to be as an influence on satisfaction.  This implies that citizen satisfaction will not 
be fully improved without their trust in the process of producing public services 
although citizens‟ high satisfaction may contribute trust in governance.   In simple terms, 
we speculate that government efforts to tackle corruption may well lead to more 
positive public perceptions (and thus greater satisfaction) long before any tangible 
improvements are experienced, and therefore increased trust will precede (and 
influence) increased citizen satisfaction.  We therefore propose that the roles of 
transparency and trust in the relationship between corruption and citizen satisfaction are 
as shown in Figure 1. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Fig 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Concerning the role of transparency and trust in the relationship between corruption 
and citizen satisfaction, the model indicates that transparency decreases corruption, but 
increases trust and satisfaction, thus: 
 
H1: Transparency will play a significant role as a moderator in the relationship 
between corruption and citizen satisfaction; transparency will significantly 
curtail corruption, but increase satisfaction, while corruption reduces satisfaction. 
 
Concerning the two roles of trust, the model shows that trust influences the 
relationship between transparency and satisfaction and the relationship between 
corruption and satisfaction.  The roles of trust were hypothesized below: 
 
H2: Trust will play a significant role as a mediator in the relationship between 
transparency and citizen satisfaction; transparency will significantly increase 
trust and satisfaction, and in turn, trust will increase satisfaction.  
 
H3: Trust will play a significant role as a mediator in the relationship between 
corruption and satisfaction; corruption will significantly reduce trust and 
satisfaction, but trust will increase satisfaction.  
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METHOD 
 
This study was based on survey data collected by the local government of 
Yeongdeungpo-gu (population c.408,000 as of April 2009), one of the sub-districts of 
Seoul, as part of their evaluation of its Public Project Quality Management OK System 
(hereafter, the OK system).  Before detailing the survey methodology, it is important to 
outline the background to the OK system, in order to clarify why it represented an ideal 
case study for examining the hypothesized relationships, shown above, between citizen 
satisfaction, corruption, transparency and trust. 
Public works construction services had been open to the criticisms of being most 
corrupt in the public sector for a long time.  For that reason, the municipality developed 
the OK system in 2006, aiming at raising citizen satisfaction by reducing corruption and 
improving the quality of the construction service.  It was expected that the system 
would effectively make the service provision transparent, and as a result, increase 
satisfaction.  Through its use of ICT the OK system allows public officers in charge of 
the services to interact with private contractors, and residents to monitor the entire 
process from public project planning to completion in real-time via the internet.  When 
visiting the municipality‟s homepage, a resident is guided by a menu of options such as 
Project, Technical, Contract, Design, Construction, Defect, and Reward, and can get full 
details of project status, technical administration, contract, construction, defect 
management, relevant documents, etc.  Its most striking feature is that residents can 
directly observe all the process of constructing roads, bridges, parks, etc. through a web 
camera established on construction sites.  Residents can also participate in the process 
as supervisors, to observe public work services and provide their opinions.  It was 
expected that the greatly increased transparency would increase trust in the services, and 
in turn, enhance citizen satisfaction.  
 
Three years after the OK system was put into operation, the municipality conducted a 
questionnaire survey of the performance of public works projects.  The survey was 
designed to answer three key questions: How successfully has the OK system achieved 
its goals?  How effective is the system in improving transparency and trust?  And what 
roles do transparency and trust play in the relationship between corruption and 
satisfaction?  The survey was conducted in January 2008.  Twenty-two resident 
investigators, representing each of the 22 smallest administrative units of the 
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municipality, were employed to conduct the survey.  They met residents randomly 
selected in advance for the survey by the evaluation team of the OK system and asked 
them to complete the survey.  Where the resident agreed to participate the researcher 
would wait to collect the completed survey, thus ensuring the highest possible 
completion rate.  The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter, which 
contained a brief introduction to the purpose of the survey.  Out of 400 questionnaires 
distributed, 368 were returned and after excluding incomplete questionnaires we were 
left with a valid sample of 348 for analysis. 
 
Measurement 
The survey comprised four scales (corruption, citizen satisfaction, transparency and 
trust) totalling 26 items, each item being a statement to which participants were invited 
to respond on a five-point Likert-scale, where „strongly agree‟ was coded as 5 and 
„strongly disagree‟ as 1.  After performing a confirmatory factor analysis on all items to 
look for patterns of similarity between items and searching a structural equation model 
best fitted to the data, 9 items (1 for corruption, 8 for transparency) were deleted, 
leaving 17 items for subsequent analysis. 
Corruption was measured by five items relating to the three elements of corruption 
proposed by Barker and Carter (1994): violations of law, rules, regulations, or ethical 
standards; misuse of public employees‟ position; and direct or indirect benefits received 
or expected from such a wrongdoing.  The question and items for corruption and the 
Cronbach's alpha statistic for the scale are shown in Table 1.  The mean score for all 
items was computed to serve as a measure of corruption.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Citizen satisfaction can be subdivided into satisfaction with public services as a 
whole and satisfaction with its specific elements, so residents‟ satisfaction with public 
works projects was surveyed in terms of the quality of the service, the municipality‟s 
competence for the service, and its performance.  The question and items are shown in 
Table 2.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The alpha value of .904 for the scale indicates very close correlation between overall 
satisfaction and satisfaction with specific items, and we therefore used the mean score 
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of the three items as a single measure of satisfaction.  For transparency thirteen items 
were originally developed; four for overall transparency of public works project 
services, three for residents’ accessibility to the information, and six for information 
disclosure by the municipality and quality of the information.  Through a confirmatory 
factor analysis, only the first five items were selected for the analysis.  The question and 
items are shown in Table 3.  As with satisfaction, the high alpha value (.917) indicates it 
would be valid to use an average of all the items to serve as the measure of transparency.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The level of perceived trust was assessed using four items, based on the operational 
definition that residents‟ trust is a subjective judgment on a government‟s integrity, 
goodwill, and competence.  The items are shown in Table 4.  The Cronbach's alpha 
value was .896, showing high consistency among individual items in the scale, so the 
average of the four items was used for statistical analysis.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Table 5 below shows the results of a confirmatory factor analysis conducted on all the 
items above for a structural equation modeling.  The four factors explain 78.147% of 
the total variance, supporting our treatment of the key variables as conceptually distinct 
and empirically distinguishable. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Finally, demographic data was collected on gender, age, and level of education.  The 
gender composition of the respondents was 197 (56.6%) males and 151 (43.4%) 
females.  The age profile was: „less than 30‟ (50, 14.3%), „30-39‟ (80, 24.7%), „40-49‟ 
(122, 35.1%), „50 or over‟ (90, 25.9%).  Educational levels of the respondents were 
„less than high school degree or equivalent‟ (131, 37.6%), „junior college degree‟ (75, 
21.6%), „4-year university degree‟ (132, 37.9%), „post graduate degree‟ (10, 2.9%). 
  
RESULTS 
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Description of statistics and correlation 
Table 6 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all of the variables, 
including an interaction term, COR*TRA, created in order to calculate the moderating 
effect of transparency on the relationship between corruption and satisfaction.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The results indicate a fairly strong correlation between corruption and resident 
satisfaction with public works projects (r= -.508, p<.001), transparency (r= -.535, 
p<.001) and trust (r= -.483, p<.001).  Satisfaction also shows a strong relationship with 
transparency (r= .663, p<.001) and trust (r= .637, p<.001).  Thus, consistent with 
expectations, corruption is negatively related to transparency, trust, and citizen 
satisfaction, while satisfaction is positively related to transparency and trust.   
 
The structural equation model 
A structural equation modeling method was used to estimate the relationship between 
the response variable (satisfaction) and the three predictor variables (corruption, 
transparency and trust), using the Amos 17.0 software package.  The structural model 
(N=348) as best fitted to the data and standardized path coefficients are suggested at 
Figure 2 below.  The relationships significant at α≤0.05 are presented by a solid line and 
the one non-significant relationship (between corruption and trust) by a dotted line. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Fig 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
The results of the structural model analysis were χ2= 231.322, degrees of 
freedom=113, p=0.000, CMIN/DF=2.047. GFI=0.929, AGFI=0.903, RMR=0.023, 
NFI=0.953.  In evaluating the fitness of the model, generally it is desirable that P value 
for χ2 is ≥ α=0.05, GFI(Goodness-of-Fit Index), AGFI(Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index), 
and NFI(Normed Fit Index) ≥ .90, and RMR(Root Mean Square Residual) ≤0.05.  For 
CMIN/DF, in that its value is not greatly more than 2, the model is considered as fitted 
although the P value of χ2 is smaller than α=0.05.  In the analysis above, although χ2 was 
significant at α≤0.05, the other indices show that the model is satisfactorily fitted to the 
data.  Accordingly, the model was accepted as fitted to the data.  Most of the 
relationships between the important variables were significant at α≤0.001, except for the 
path between TRU and SAT (p=0.002) and the path between COR and TRU (p=.213).  
Only the path between COR and TRU appeared as not significant.  The standardized 
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coefficients indicate that the effect of transparency on corruption is considerably strong 
(regression weight=-.58), and its effect on satisfaction is greater than that of trust or 
corruption.  
 
The moderating role of transparency 
The effect of transparency as a moderating variable was examined by the parameter 
estimate for the interaction term COR*TRA.  To test a moderating effect, the three 
regression equations below were examined. 
 
⑴ y = b0 + b1x1 
⑵ y = b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 
⑶ y = b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 + b3(x1*x2) 
 
If b2≠0, but b3=0, x2 is not a moderator but simply another independent variable.  If 
b2=0, but b3≠0, x2 is a pure moderator.  If b2≠0 and b3≠0, the equations, i.e., ⑴, ⑵ and 
⑶ are different with each other, x2 is a quasi moderator.  To test Hypothesis 1, that 
transparency will play a significant role as a moderator in the relationship between 
corruption and citizen satisfaction, hierarchical regression analysis was performed 
taking satisfaction as the dependent variable.  The results are shown in Table 7.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------- 
One independent variable in a regression model SAT1, corruption explains about 26 
percent of the variance of resident satisfaction (Adjusted R
2
= .256, p<.001), two 
independent variables in SAT2 explain 47 percent(Adjusted R
2
= .469, p<.001), and 
three independent variables in SAT3 including the interaction term, COR*TRA, explain 
48 percent of the variance of resident satisfaction (Adjusted R
2
= .478, p<.001).  
Regression coefficients b2≠0 and b3≠0 are confirmed.  Therefore, H1 is accepted.  When 
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the interaction term is added to the regression model of resident satisfaction, the 
explanatory power of the regression model of resident satisfaction is slightly 
strengthened, changing the size of Adjusted R
2
 from .469 to .478.  However the effect 
of corruption on satisfaction greatly changed from b1= -.186 (p=.000) to b1=.229 
(p=.167) and its effect became non-significant.  Although it was not significant, its 
direction also changed, indicating that transparency very strongly moderates the 
relationship between the two variables. 
 
The mediating role of trust 
Hierarchal regression analysis and the Sobel test are commonly used to test the effect 
of a mediating variable.  Four steps should be also completed to infer the influence of a 
mediator between the two variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Kenny et al., 1998) by 
checking: first, that the independent variable predicts the dependent variable; second, 
that the independent variable predicts the mediator; third, that the mediator predicts the 
dependent variable; finally, that the independent variable does not predict the dependent 
variable while controlling for the mediator.  The fourth step is used to judge whether the 
role of a mediator is pure or quasi.  We outlined above the four conditions which must 
be met for a mediation model, and regression analysis was conducted to test whether 
these conditions were satisfied – see Table 8 below. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The results of analyzing the relationships between the relevant variables indicate that 
they are significantly correlated, showing that the first three conditions for testing a 
mediating role of trust were met; transparency significantly increases trust, trust has a 
significant impact on satisfaction, and transparency significantly increases satisfaction.  
This confirms that the first three steps for Hypothesis 2 were satisfied.  The first three 
steps for Hypothesis 3 were also met: corruption significantly decreases trust, but trust 
significantly increases satisfaction, and corruption significantly decreases satisfaction 
(As for corruption→ satisfaction, see Table 7).  To test whether a mediating role of trust 
is significant or not, a Sobel test was conducted (see Table 9 below).  The test results of 
the fourth step are suggested in Table 10 and 11 respectively. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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The results indicate that the mediating roles of trust in the relationship between 
transparency and satisfaction, and between corruption and satisfaction are significantly 
supported. The pure or quasi role of a mediator is evaluated by the extent to which the 
mediator accounts for the relation between the predictor and the dependent variables.  
To evaluate whether the mediating effect of trust in the relationship between 
transparency and the satisfaction is significant, hierarchical regression analysis was 
conducted.  Table 10 shows the results. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The effect of transparency on satisfaction reduced but did not become zero when trust 
was introduced in the regression model (from b= .667 to b= .426, both results 
significant at p<.001).  The contribution of transparency to satisfaction shrank after 
controlling for the effect of trust on satisfaction, but the unique effect of transparency 
remains significantly different from zero.  This indicates that trust is a partial rather than 
complete mediator in the relationship between transparency and satisfaction.  In sum, 
Hypotheses 2 was accepted while the fourth condition was partially met.  This indicates 
that trust plays as a quasi mediator between transparency and satisfaction.  The 
mediating effect of trust in the relationship between corruption and resident satisfaction 
is shown in Table 11.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The predictors, corruption and trust, explain about 46% of the variance in resident 
satisfaction (Adjusted R
2
= .455, p<.001).  In the first regression analysis, corruption is 
negatively related with satisfaction (b=-.441, p<.001).  In the second analysis, the effect 
of corruption on the satisfaction is greatly reduced (b= -.227, p<.001), upon the addition 
of the mediator to the model.  However, the effect of corruption remains significant, and 
different from zero.  This indicates that Hypothesis 3 is significantly accepted but the 
fourth condition is also partially met, i.e. trust is a quasi mediator in the association of 
the two variables.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Before considering the implications of our findings, it is important to acknowledge 
certain limitations.  As the literature review demonstrated, there is little consensus 
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concerning the measurement of important variables such as corruption, transparency, 
trust, and satisfaction.  The definition of corruption in particular varies widely, 
hindering the progress of understanding it.  While suggesting an integrated theory of 
governmental corruption, Nas et al. (1986) confess that ‘one of the difficulties with this 
topic stems from the lack of a widely accepted definition of corruption’ – see also Doig 
et al (2006).  Transparency is similarly problematic, Florini (2007: 4) noting that ‘there 
is no consensus on what the definition should be or how transparency should be 
measured,’ whilst Heald (2006: 40) suggests that „the multiple directions and varieties 
of transparency and the mediating effects of habitat hinder defining and constructing 
indexes of transparency.‟  The definitions of trust also show some variation, although at 
least here we can reassure ourselves with the Rousseau et al (1998) finding that the 
variation is not significant.  The measurement of trust may however remain an issue –
many studies (ours included) rely upon survey data gathered by others, typically 
government, and as there are no commonly used scales, this inhibits comparison of 
results from different studies.  In addition, Bouckaert &Van de Walle (2003) note a 
trend to use measures of trust and measures of citizen satisfaction as proxy measures for 
good governance, which risks conflating variables which the present study has treated 
as distinct.  Despite these issues, the scales used in the present study were clearly robust, 
and the findings can therefore be seen to shed light on the roles of transparency and trust 
in the relationship between corruption and citizen satisfaction.  Transparency was found 
to serve as a significant moderator, increasing satisfaction while reducing corruption, 
through its role in the process by which corruption reduces satisfaction.  Trust was also 
revealed as a significant mediator in the relationship between transparency and 
satisfaction, as well as between corruption and satisfaction. 
The findings highlight several crucial issues for the improvement of citizen 
satisfaction.  First, the roles of transparency and trust need to be taken into account as 
important factors in developing policy aimed at reducing corruption and improving 
citizen satisfaction.  One of our most important findings is that the effect of corruption 
on reducing citizen satisfaction was largely generated by the moderating or mediating 
role of transparency and trust, i.e. indirectly by the two variables rather than directly by 
corruption itself.  Transparency clearly plays a key role in the relation between 
corruption, trust, and citizen satisfaction, and Holzner and Holzner (2006: 114) go as far 
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as to argue that transparency is ‘a value likely to change the relation between citizens 
and authorities’, making it necessary for governments to strengthen their disclosure of 
information.   
Second, the role of transparency in the relationship between corruption and citizen 
satisfaction might differ depending upon varieties of transparency.  Some scholars point 
out that there might be various types of transparency and that the benefits and costs of 
transparency depend on their characteristics and consequences (Heald, 2006; Hood, 
2006).  Tackling the case of leaking information to the press, de Jong and de Vries 
(2007) report that transparency is not desirable in all situations.  Heald (2006) 
conceptualises transparency in terms of three dichotomies: event versus process 
transparency, transparency in retrospect versus in real time, and nominal versus 
effective transparency, referring to the gap between perception and reality.  In respect of 
the latter distinction, Heald (2006) identifies the risk of a „transparency illusion‟ arising 
from a divergence between nominal and effective transparency, such that even when 
transparency appears to be increasing, the opposite may be true in reality.  Following 
Heald‟s typology, we might categorise the transparency created by the OK system as 
being „process‟ and „real time,‟ as the whole process of public works construction is 
disclosed to residents in real time, mediated through ICT applications.  The important 
question is whether it is „effective‟ or „nominal‟ transparency.  We suggest that it might 
be categorised as „nominal‟, not in the sense that it is illusory or ineffective, but in the 
sense that when an e-government system like OK provides disclosure of a large quantity 
of information in real time to the public, there is a risk that the actual transparency 
created may be relatively nominal, not least because very few citizens will actually have 
the time or expertise to scrutinise the information in a manner which might lead to 
greater accountability.  
Third, it is important to note that, in the potential gap between expectations and 
reality, influences such as mass media and culture play an important role in how citizens 
think about an ICT-based system for transparency such as OK.  For example, if 
improved transparency leads to residents becoming aware of a higher level of corruption 
than they expected, transparency may actually cause reduced citizen satisfaction.  
Likewise even disclosure of a high level of corruption could lead to increased 
satisfaction if it is lower than expected.  There may also be an important difference 
between public reactions to overall levels of corruption and specific high-profile cases.  
These cases may not affect trust if it already high, but the recent scandal in the UK 
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regarding corruption by Members of Parliament over their expenses suggests that where 
public trust and confidence in government is low, such episodes (even though the scale 
of the corruption was tiny in monetary terms) can have a significant impact.  It is 
interesting to note that one of the proposed solutions has been the adoption of 
transparent online system for claiming expenses.  Further research is required to explore 
the complex role of ICT-based transparency in the perceptual relationship between 
corruption and citizen satisfaction. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Many efforts on the part of governments have failed to prevent corruption and stem 
the loss of trust caused by scandals.  Despite the important roles played by transparency 
and trust in reducing corruption and improving citizen satisfaction with public services, 
little systematic analysis has been undertaken to understand the relationship between 
them.  Our findings show that transparency and trust play a substantial role, as 
moderator and mediator respectively, in curtailing corruption and enhancing citizen 
satisfaction.  In this respect, this study holds great promise for giving insights for 
increasing satisfaction.  The data allowed us to test our proposed model, and this 
provides a basis for future studies across a range of settings to examine systematically 
the roles of transparency and trust in the relationships between corruption and citizen 
satisfaction.   
We acknowledge there may be limits on the generalization of this study, so often a 
crucial issue for application, as it was carried out as a case study of the specific situation 
of a local authority in Seoul and its public works construction services, so its main 
utility is in terms of providing a test of our proposed model.  However, it is worth 
noting that the specific of the case, namely a situation in which e-government was 
introduced to address issues of corruption and low citizen satisfaction in respect of 
processes with which the citizens do not directly engage (public works in this instance), 
are sufficiently common that they may be applicable to many potential e-government 
projects. 
The study highlights some of the ambiguities regarding the benefits of transparency, 
which need further exploration. Some scholars are critical of the argument that 
governments should be in favour of complete disclosure of their information.  Prat 
(2006: 91) acknowledges that „more information about the agent‟s behaviour makes the 
agent more accountable‟, but argues that „it is not necessarily true that more disclosure 
makes the agent behave better‟, while O‟Neill (2006) claims that „mere transparency 
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may worsen communication by spreading confusion‟.  Transparency has limits to its 
scope of application in practice, with full transparency undesirable in a number of areas 
in the public sector for various reasons, including the right to privacy, heavy costs of 
disclosure, and the risks of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information (Prat, 2006; 
Heald, 2006).  The benefits of transparency may also be limited, with Birkinshaw 
(2006) noting that transparency might present obstacles to efficient government or 
representative democracy.  Heald (2006: 60) argues that lack of transparency may 
actually ‘contribute positively to social functioning,’ and concludes that there may be ‘an 
optimal level of transparency that is less than maximum transparency.‟  Consequently, 
transparency might have clear limits to its utility as a method for deterring corruption 
and improving citizen satisfaction. 
The impact of transparency on corruption is clearly an important issue for public 
administration, but the issues of trust in government and citizen satisfaction are also 
hugely important, and our findings suggest a complex interplay between these four 
variables.  An important recommendation from our findings would therefore be that 
researchers focusing on the relationship between any of these variables (e.g. 
transparency and corruption) would do well to examine the other relationships at the 
same time.  This provides for the development of more robust theory, but also has 
important implications for policy.  For example, evaluating a particular transparency 
intervention designed to decrease corruption might show that it has only marginal anti-
corruption effects, and is therefore not worth pursuing.  However, if we also evaluate its 
impacts on improving trust in government and citizen satisfaction, this would provide 
policymakers with a holistic view of the value of the intervention from which to judge 
its worth. 
A number of important questions remain to be addressed.  Is there reciprocity 
between transparency and trust?  Is the relationship between transparency and trust 
linear?  More transparency is likely to be beneficial at a very low level of trust.  On the 
other hand, when a high level of trust in government exists, increasing transparency 
may actually reduce trust (Oliver, 2004; Meijer, 2009).  In addition, as we noted above, 
although trust influences citizen satisfaction it is also the case that satisfaction can 
improve trust in public services.  More research is needed to our understanding of the 
impact of transparency and trust on corruption and citizen satisfaction, and the present 
study provides a platform for this.  
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TABLE 1 
Scale Items, and Alpha for Corruption (N= 348) 
Scale/Item        Scale Alpha 
Corruption (COR)    Cronbach‟s Alpha = .930 
Question: What do you think of the public works of the municipality? 
c1. There are malpractices associated with sub-contracts in managing the 
construction and engineering of public works. 
c2. There is inappropriate participation of contractors who are under required 
standards in public works projects. 
c3. There is an atmosphere that something valuable has to be given to public 
officials in charge to smoothly complete public works construction. 
c4. The works of projects aren‟t fair in some senses. 
c5. There is partiality via personal relations in public works projects. 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Scale Items, and Alpha for Citizen Satisfaction (N= 348) 
Scale/Item        Scale Alpha 
Corruption 
- 
FIGURE 1. Relationship between the Variables 
+ 
 - Satisfaction 
Trust 
- 
+ 
 + 
Transparency 
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Satisfaction (SAT)    Cronbach‟s Alpha = .904 
Question: To what degree are you satisfied with the municipality’s public work 
construction projects? 
s1. I am satisfied with the municipality‟s public works projects. 
s2. I am satisfied with the municipality‟s competency to implement public works 
projects. 
s3. I am satisfied with the results of public works projects. 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Scale Items, and Alpha for Transparency (N= 348) 
Scale/Item        Scale Alpha 
Transparency (TRA)    Cronbach‟s Alpha = .917 
Question: How transparent do you think the municipality’s public work projects 
are? 
tr1. The municipality‟s public works projects are implemented transparently. 
tr2. The entire process of the municipality‟s public works projects is transparently 
disclosed. 
tr3. The residents can clearly see into the progress and situations of public works 
projects. 
tr4. The works of public works projects are transparently done. 
tr5. The municipality discloses sufficient information to the residents on its public 
works projects. 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Scale Items, and Alpha for Trust (N= 348) 
Scale/Item        Scale Alpha 
Trust (TRU)    Cronbach‟s Alpha = .896 
Question: How much do you trust in the municipality’s public work projects? 
tu1. The municipality will not deceive its residents in its public works projects. 
tu2. The municipality will first consider the interest of the residents before its 
self-interest in public works projects. 
tu3. The municipality will not do harm to the residents by its negligence on 
public works projects. 
tu4. I trust in the municipality‟s public works projects. 
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TABLE 5  
Results of Factor Analysis on the Question Items (N=348) 
Variables\Items Factors 
F1 F2 F3 F4 
Corruption 
(COR)  
c1 .831 -.158 -.132 -.166 
c2 .857 -.122 -.187 -.123 
c3 .816 -.199 -.143 -.162 
c4 .838 -.179 -.170 -.189 
c5 .836 -.268 -.146 -.148 
Satisfaction 
(SAT) 
s1 -.253 .323 .285 .733 
s2 -.225 .245 .237 .838 
s3 -.217 .272 .248 .827 
Transparency 
(TRA) 
tr1 -.206 .718 .369 .247 
tr2 -.213 .706 .370 .248 
tr3 -.199 .768 .256 .273 
tr4 -.289 .705 .357 .215 
tr5 -.212 .786 .256 .182 
Trust 
(TRU) 
tu1 -.204 .345 .768 .175 
tu2 -.177 .289 .795 .232 
tu3 -.200 .325 .739 .204 
tu4 -.183 .347 .707 .296 
Eigenvalues 9.258 2.154 1.056 .817 
Cumulative Percents 54.458 65.128 73.341 78.147 
1) Extraction method: Principal component analysis.  
2) Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization. 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (N=348) 
 
MEAN SD COR SAT TRA TRU COR*TRA GEN AGE EDU 
COR 2.45  .88 1.00        
SAT 3.55  .75 -.508*** 1.00       
TRA 3.50 .75 -.535*** .663*** 1.00      
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TRU 3.63  .71 -.483*** .637*** .761*** 1.00     
COR*TRA 4.11 1.35 .799*** -.175*** .037 -.056 1.00    
GEN 1.43  .50 .285*** -.285*** -.307*** -.293*** .134* 1.00   
AGE 2.72 1.00 .016 -.034 -.022 .016 .006 -.129* 1.00  
EDU 2.06  .93 -.140** .044 .066 .072 -.121* -.156** -.269*** 1.00 
1) 
* 
p<.05. 
** 
p<.01. 
*** 
p<.001; two tailed tests. 
2) See Table 1-4 for variable abbreviations. The others are: GEN=gender, AGE= age, 
EDU=levels of education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 
Results of Regressing Satisfaction on Corruption and Transparency (N=348) 
 
Predictors
 
Dependant Variable: Satisfaction
 
SAT1 SAT2 SAT3 
FIGURE 2. Path Coefficients for the Structural Equation Model 
tr1 tr2 tr3 tr4 tr5 
tu1 tu2 tu3 tu4 
c1 
c2 
c3 
c4 
c5 
s1 
s2 
s3 
TRA 
COR SAT 
TRU 
-.18 
.81 
-.58 
-.06 
.29 
.37 
.84 
.84 .80 
.83 
e1 
e2 
e3 
e4 
e5 
e6 
e7 
e8 
e11 
.84 .84 .80 .82 .85 
.84 
.89 
.89 
.83 
.85 
.83 
.87 
.88 
e9 e10 e13 e12 
e17 e14 e15 e16 
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B Beta T B Beta T B Beta T 
Constant 4.631  44.266
***
 2.077     8.906
***
 1.060  2.327
*
 
COR -.441 -.508 -10.963
***
 -.186 -.214 -4.630
***
 .229 .263 1.386 
TRA    .551 .548 11.839
***
 .824 .819 7.171*** 
COR*TRA       -.232 -.416 -2.591** 
    
F Value 120.192
***
 154.344
***
 106.839
*** 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
.256 .469 .478
 
*
p<.05;
 **
p<.01; 
***
p<.001; 2-tailed tests. 
 
 
TABLE 8 
The relationship Between the Relevant Variables (N=348) 
Paths(Predictors 
→Dependent 
Variables)  
B Std. Error T Adjusted 
R
2
 
F Value 
TRA→TRU .725 .033 21.815*** .578 475.882*** 
TRA→SAT .667 .040 16.469*** .438 271.224*** 
COR→TRU -.587 .057 -10.271*** .231 105.501*** 
TRU→SAT  .673 .044 15.369*** .404 236.194*** 
***
p<.001; 2-tailed tests. 
 
 
TABLE 9 
Results of the Sobel Test (N=348) 
Paths Test Statistics Std. Error P Value 
COR→TRU→SAT -8.543 .046 .000 
TRA→TRU→SAT 12.553 .039 .000 
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TABLE 10 
Regression Analysis of Impact of Transparency on Satisfaction, 
Controlling for Trust (N=348) 
 
Predictors 
Dependant Variables 
SAT
 
B Beta T Adjusted R
2
 F Value 
Constant  1.216   8.391
***
  
.438 
 
271.224
***
 TRA  .667  .663 16.469
***
 
Constant  .853   5.481
***
 
 
.478 
 
159.964
***
 
TRA  .426  .423  7.083
***
 
TRU  .333  .315  5.267
***
 
*** 
p<.001; 2-tailed tests. 
 
 
TABLE 11 
Regression Analysis of Impact of Corruption on Satisfaction, 
Controlling for Trust (N=348) 
 
Predictors 
Dependant Variables 
SAT
 
B Beta T Adjusted R
2
 F Value 
Constant 4.631  44.266
***
  
.256 
 
120.192
***
 COR -.441 -.508 -10.963
***
 
Constant 2.148   9.040
***
 
 
.455 
 
145.661
***
 
COR -.227 -.261 -5.759
***
 
TRU .540  .511 11.281
***
 
*** 
p<.001; 2-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
